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This paper is based on large-scale surveys of formal and 
informal small businesses in South Africa, including 
questions about their experiences and perceptions about 
tax compliance, tax morale, and related variables. The 
survey findings suggest that formalization is more likely 
to take place in urban areas, involving relatively larger 
firms, and those who already use proper bookkeeping. 
Informal firms who said they were likely to register 
This paper—a product of the Regulatory Simplification Unit, Investment Climate Department—is part of a larger effort in 
the department to reduce unnecessary tax compliance costs on businesses. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted 
on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at jcoolidge@worldbank.org  
for tax in the near future were more likely than other 
informal firms to report higher satisfaction with 
government services, and to believe most businesses pay 
their taxes. The most-cited advantages of being registered 
for tax included better access to government services, 
better access to financing, and better opportunities for 
growth.  
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Background and motivation: The Government of South Africa is committed to encouraging the 
growth of entrepreneurship in the country, including the formalization of informal firms. To this 
end, the National Treasury (NT) and the South Africa Revenue Service (SARS) have been 
developing tax policy and tax administration reforms, including a “tax amnesty” for many 
previous informal firms and a concerted effort to reduce the tax compliance burden on Small, 
Medium, and Micro Enterprises (SMMEs).
1
•  A survey of professional tax practitioners (TP) about their SMME clients 
 For the purposes of this study, and in line with 
current tax legislation in South Africa, SMMEs are defined as those with an annual turnover 
under R 14 million (about US$ 2 million). 
 
At the request of the National Treasury of South Africa (NT) and the South Africa Revenue 
Service (SARS) in 2006, the Foreign Investment Advisory Service of the World Bank Group 
(FIAS) initiated a set of surveys to measure the tax compliance burden for SMMEs. Earlier 
studies in South Africa (e.g., SBP 2005) had also documented onerous compliance burdens on 
SMMEs, including tax compliance costs in particular. 
 
Anecdotal evidence in South Africa suggested that many of the smallest firms struggle with tax 
compliance, as is common elsewhere in the world (see Literature Review, below). Meanwhile, 
fear of “making mistakes” on taxes and the risk of heavy penalties imposed by SARS (in 
addition to unwillingness to pay taxes) was said to be a factor deterring formalization of many 
informal firms. Other research in South Africa suggested that broader attitudes about the fairness 
of the fiscal system (both spending and taxation) and the quality of public services also had an 
influence on the willingness of the owners of informal firms to formalize and start paying taxes 
(Fjeldstein, 2004). 
 
Brief Overview of the Survey:  To document the extent of the problem in South Africa, FIAS 
worked with NT and SARS to design a set of three surveys: 
 
•  A survey of SMMEs registered with SARS 
•  A survey of informal SMMEs regarding their perceptions of tax compliance costs. 
 
The latter two surveys listed above were both co-financed by USAID and carried out by Citizen 
Surveys. The surveys focused on firms with turnover between R70,000 and R 14 million to 
exclude both the tiniest “survivalist” firms (e.g., those whose income would be too low to be 
assessed for personal income tax if they were employees) as well are large firms. The survey 
field work for the informality survey included 1,000 small businesses that were not registered 
with SARS (based on area sampling) and took place in mid 2007. The survey of formal firms 
included 1,000 businesses as a representative sample drawn from the SARS database of 
registered business taxpayers and was completed in late 2007. Both reports were finalized in 
March 2008 (USAID, 2008).  
 
                                                 
1 For details of the new tax regime for micro-enterprises (i.e., those under R 1 million turnover), see 
http://www.sars.gov.za./home.asp?pid=43122  3 
 
Research Goals: NT and SARS asked FIAS to make use of the survey data to answer a number 
of questions about the formalization of informal firms, including the following (for details about 
analytical methods, see Annex 1): 
 
•  What are the characteristics of the 12% of formal firms who reported they had operated 
for some time before registering with SARS? 
•  What are the characteristics of the informal firms who reported they are considering 
registering with SARS? 
•  Is there a “bridge” that can be found between informal and formal firms? 
•  What do informal firms know about their tax obligations? 
•  What are some of the key attitudes of informal firms that may be related to their decisions 
about formalizing and registering with SARS? 
 
The structure of this paper is as follows. After this introduction, Part 1 provides a summary of 
the relevant international tax compliance research; Part 2 describes the main survey findings and 
Part 3 contains conclusions and policy implications. 
 
1.  Literature Review 
 
The original assumptions about tax compliance were rooted in standard analyses of 
maximization of expected income, taking into account the risks and penalties associated with 
non-compliance (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972).However, empirical data quickly revealed that 
taxpayers throughout the world paid much more tax than could be accounted for even by the 
highest feasible levels of auditing, penalties and risk-aversion. The question therefore switched 
from “why do taxpayers evade” to “why do taxpayers comply?” (Alm, et al..1992, 2003). 
 
The more recent literature on tax compliance has taken into account economic theory, 
experimental design, and survey results. While much of the analysis has focused on individual 
taxpayers, the behavior of business taxpayers (including the self-employed and small business 
owners as well as managers of joint-stock companies) should probably be similar, and if 
anything the “elasticity” of tax compliance to the tax burden for business taxpayers should be 
probably higher than for individuals. Capital has long been documented as the most mobile 
among the main factors of production. Thus, Tiebout (1956) pointed out that taxpayers can “vote 
with their feet” by migrating between different jurisdictions, so governments throughout the 
world must take note that much investment can be “footloose” and that overly heavy tax burdens 
can deter investment – either encouraging it to search for locations that offer the highest 
expected after-tax rate of return or discouraging entrepreneurship in favor of wage labor. See 
also OECD Guidance Note on Tax Compliance (2004). 
 
The OECD (2001) describes the use of surveys to gather evidence on tax compliance, and points 
out that their strengths include “their ability to capture a broad range of explanatory variables 
known only to taxpayers, notably their understanding of compliance requirements, relevant 
values and attitudes, expectations of risks and benefits of non-compliance ... [while 
disadvantages include] variations in definitions of issues such as non compliance, the integrity of 




Most importantly, Alm et al. stressed that “individuals exhibit much diversity in their 
behaviour.” Some are primarily worried about getting caught and penalized; others (especially 
businesspeople who face competition) are more concerned about the behavior of other 
taxpayers/neighbors/competitors; others think in terms of civic duty and/or public services and 
may weigh those considerations against the perceived accountability and efficiency of the state. 
These different factors are all likely to vary across different countries, institutions, and cultures, 
and much information about such factors can be estimated from surveys.  
 
Alm et al. also found that “tax revenues increase with greater enforcement efforts, but this payoff 
declines as the probability [i.e., of being caught and punished for tax evasion] increases.” They 
later note that “compliance increases with [indicators of the availability of public goods and 
services], and suggest that government can increase compliance by providing goods that their 
citizens prefer more, by providing these goods in a more efficient manner, or by more effectively 
emphasizing that taxes are necessary for receipt of government services.” 
 
Tax compliance can also have important spillover benefits to firms. The literature on tax 
compliance notes that one indirect benefit of tax compliance is the discipline imposed on small 
businesses to prepare and maintain accurate financial accounts (e.g., income statement, balance 
sheet).  Sandford (1995) noted many of the relevant benefits (particularly improvements in 
information systems and financial control) and these have been further documented by the tax 
compliance cost literature. 
 
Cummings et al (2004) used both survey-based evidence and experimental results in the U.S., 
South Africa and Botswana and concluded that tax morale and tax compliance levels appear to 
be influenced by “the fairness of tax administration, the perceived fiscal exchange, and the 
overall attitude towards the respective governments.” 
 
Alm and Torgler (2006) analyzed tax morale and correlations with cultural differences in the 
U.S. and Europe. There is strong evidence that tax morale differs across countries, with relatively 
higher tax morale in the U.S., Austria and Switzerland and relatively lower tax morale in Spain, 
Portugal and Belgium. They also found strong negative correlation between the size of the 
“shadow economy” and the degree of tax morale
2. Higher “tax morale”, in turn, is correlated 
with various estimates of tax compliance
3
In South Africa, Fjeldstad analyzed compliance with local “service charges” (user fees that bear 
some similarity to taxes) using survey data, and found that failure to comply with service charges 
(which displayed high degrees of variation both within communities and between communities 
. 
 
                                                 
2 “Tax morale” was measured by responses to survey questions from the World Values Survey: “Please tell me for 
each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in 
between: … Cheating on tax if you have the chance.”  The size of the shadow economy is measured as a percent of 
official GDP, using the estimates of the shadow economy from Schneider and Klinglmair (2003) based largely on 
currency demand. 
3 Although Alm, Lewis and others have noted that “tax evasion is notoriously difficult to measure”. For example, 
Alm and Martinez-Vazquez note “A major difficulty in analyzing evasion is its measurement” and in turn cite Tanzi 
(1980) and Schneider and Enste (2000) “for discussion and applications of various approaches to measurement, all 
of which are subject to much imprecision and controversy.” Lewis says “Methods of assessing the extent of tax 
evasion have been indirect and open to a great deal of error.” He goes on to cite Gutman’s methods, (later elaborated 
by Schneider), using cash demand as a proportion of the money supply as a proxy variable for evasion. However, in 
the 21
st century, the growing use of electronic finance has also opened up many new opportunities for tax evasion. 5 
 
with similar socio-economic characteristics) was associated not only with “ability to pay” but 
also strongly correlated with the following three variables: 
 
(1) Trust in the local government to use revenues to provide expected services 
(2)  Trust in the authorities to establish fair procedures for revenue collection and 
distribution of services 
(3) Trust in other citizens to pay their share. 
 
 
2.  Main Survey Findings 
 
Overall 12% of formal businesses reported operating at least for a while before registering for 
tax. When informal businesses were asked how likely it is for them to register for tax in the next 
two years 66% of valid responses suggest that it is at least to some extent likely
4
Figures 1 and 2 below focus on the data by province. It appears that businesses in Gauteng and 
Western Cape are the ones most oriented toward the formal sector: Almost 80 % of informal 
firms in Gauteng report they are at least somewhat likely to register for tax, while only 5% of 
formal businesses reported they had ever operated informally before registering for tax. By 
contrast, in Kwazulu Natal (which, like the previous two mentioned, is a relatively urbanized 
province), only 56% of informal businesses say they are likely to register for tax and 15% of 
formal businesses reported they had operated informally before registering for tax. Western Cape 
has low number of formal SMMEs who reported operating informally, but roughly an “average” 
proportion of informal firms reporting likelihood to register for tax. In the less urbanized 
































































Percentage of formal businesses (not) operating before registering




                                                 
4 The number of non-valid responses is 84 and they mostly refer to answer ‘I don’t know’. If we include these 
answers, the share of respondents claiming that it is at least to some extent likely that they will register for tax in the 
next 2 years is 60.3%. 
5 Survey data was not conducive to a strict urban/rural analysis. 6 
 
Figures 3 and 4 below provide a picture of the sector breakdown. Among informal businesses, 
those in Agriculture, construction and manufacturing report the highest likelihood to register for 
tax. Similarly, among formal firms, respondents in these sectors reported a relatively higher 






















































Percentage of formal businesses (not) operating before registering





Figures 5 and 6 focus on employment. As might be expected, among informal businesses, those 
with more employees are relatively more likely to report a possibility for registering for tax.  
Among formal businesses, those with with over 30 employees were the least likely to reported 




Figure 5: Likelihood for registering for tax 











































Figure 6: Operated before registering for tax 










































Percentage of formal businesses (not) operating before registering





Informal – formal “bridge” 
 
To investigate the possible “bridge” (i.e., regular similarities that could be found in the survey 
data) between the informal and formal companies we undertook an analysis focusing on two 
specific samples in both surveys.   These samples represent those formal businesses who 
reported they had been operating for a while before formalizing, and those informal businesses 
who reported likelihood for formalization within the next two years. A note should be made that 
the two surveys used different methodologies
6
o  Agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, construction and manufacturing 
, and that sometimes makes the comparison rather 
difficult. 
 
The analysis that follows will try to investigate what kinds of businesses tend to be more 




Due to different methodologies and different structures of the formal and informal economies, 
the sector structure of two samples (formal and informal businesses) is not comparable without 
some regrouping of categories. In order to compare these samples three broad sectors were 
newly established: 
 
o  Trade 
o  Other Services 
 
 
Figure 7: Operating before registering (for formal businesses) and likelihood of registering 




























Agriculture, mining, forestry, construction, manufacturing Trade Services Total
 
                                                 
6 Formal survey was done using telephone interviewing as a data collection method while informal survey was done “face – to – face”. The formal survey was based on a 
representative sample  of SMMEs registered with SARS while the informal survey used area based sampling. 8 
 
 
Additional Chi square tests showed no statistically significant differences between sectors in the 
formal sample, but statistically significant differences do appear to exist among the informal 
businesses
7
The T-test shows that the difference in the number of workers among informal businesses likely 
to register and those not likely to register is significant
. The analysis of this significant difference in the informal sample and a tendency in 
the formal one shows that businesses in agriculture, mining, forestry, fishing, construction and 
manufacturing tend to be more frequently a part of the bridge between the formal and the 
informal economy, while service sector businesses (other than trade) tend to be a part of this 
bridge less frequently, and trade is in the middle.  
 
In other words, informal firms in primary industries and manufacturing more frequently report 
they are likely to formalize and conversely, are the same sectors among formal firms that are 
most likely to have operated for a period of time informally. In contrast, informal firms in the 
service sector report they are relatively more likely to stay in the informal sector, while formal 
firms in the service sector are more likely to have started out formal (i.e., registered for tax) to 



































Percentage of informal businesses likely to register
 and that the likelihood for tax 
registration is higher if the business employs more workers. The same can be seen when looking 




Figure 8: Informal business size and likelihood for tax registration 
 
                                                 
7 Chi square = 12.713, significant on 1% level 
8 T = 4.052, significant on 1% level 9 
 
 
Registration with Government Agencies and Business Associations 
 
As Figure 9 clearly suggests, businesses that are already registered at some government agency or 
professional association (the national business registry - CIPRO, Chamber of Commerce, Business 
associations, Workers Compensation and other)






































                                                 
9 Chi square = 13.034, significant on 1% level 10 
 
Location of business operation and value of assets 
 
It seems that business owners who are renting their business premises are more likely to consider 
tax formalization (See Figure 10)
10. They may be at highest risk from their landlords declaring their 
rental income and thereby being discovered by SARS.  Landlords may also want to see tax 
clearance certificates as part of their credit clearance. The value of assets does not seem to 
significantly influence the likelihood for registering for tax (t-test does not result in a statistically 
significant difference), and as Figure 11 suggests, it seems to be the lowest among businesses with 
the lowest value of assets.
11
Figure 10: Location of business operation 













































Percentage of informal businesses likely to register
 








50 55 60 65 70 75
Total
10K Rand or less
11K - 30K Rand
31K - 70K Rand
71K - 200K Rand
















Percentage of informal businesses likely to register
 
 
Customers’ method of payment 
 
As expected, the survey data supports the supposition that cash payments from customers have a 
negative influence on likelihood for tax registration. Businesses reporting using only cash payments 

































Percentage of informal businesses likely to register
. 
 
Figure 12: Payment method and likelihood for tax registration 
 
 
                                                 
10 Chi square = 12.999, significant on 1% level 
11 Only visual inspection of the figure suggests this assessment. Statistical tests do not demonstrate statistical significance. 




Record keeping practices 
 
 
Businesses already doing their complete financials either on paper or on the computer are more 





50 55 60 65 70 75 80
Total
Keeping complete




























Percentage of informal businesses likely to register
. About 23% of respondents claimed to keep complete financials either on 
paper or in the computer, while 77% reported they do not. It would be expected that larger 
businesses are more likely to use more sophisticated record keeping practices than smaller firms, 
and this may account for the difference. 
 
 







One might hypothesize that record keeping practices do not have an independent influence on the 
likelihood for registration, and that their influence is registered only due to their correlation with 
business size (that indeed does have a significant influence on likelihood for registration as shown 










                                                 






















































Additional testing showed that there is a significant difference in the likelihood for registration 
between record keeping and non-record keeping businesses, but only for the two smallest 
categories
14
                                                 
14 For businesses with 1 employee -  Chi square = 6.546,  significant on 5% level; for businesses with 2 employees -  Chi square = 4.321, significant on 5% level 
 (with 1 and 2 employees). This analysis supports a conclusion that bookkeeping 
practices have an independent, positive influence on the likelihood for registration, at least among 



















Knowledge about nearest SARS office and its distance 
 
 
Informal businesses reporting that they know where the nearest SARS office is are more likely to 
register for tax than other respondents
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Total
30 minutes or less


























Percentage of informal businesses likely to register
, it seems that the distance to the nearest SARS office (comparing those reporting they are 
less than 30 minutes versus more than 30 minutes away) has some influence on the likelihood of 
registration. If so, these findings may suggest there is merit in ensuring an adequate “field presence” 
of tax offices – either to provide wider outreach of services or to increase the (perceived) 




Figure 15: Awareness of the nearest SARS office and its distance and likelihood for tax 
registration 
                                                 
15 Chi square = 13.125, significant on 1% level 
16 Chi square = 3.483, significant on 7% level 14 
 
Attitudes and likelihood for formalization 
 
 
To analyze various aspects of informal respondents’ attitudes and the relationship of such attitudes 
to their likelihood for formalization, 14 statements
17
Attitude: Government gives a good return for 
taxes paid 
 
 rated by respondents will be grouped in 




































































Percentage of informal businesses likely to register
 respondents who report a 
feeling that businesses are getting “good 
service” from the government for taxes paid are 
much more likely to consider registration. The 
difference is quite large and highly significant. 
This finding underscores the importance of 
overall governance to tax compliance, and has 
been documented in other countries (e.g., Alm 
and Martinez-Vazquez, 2003). 
 
 
Figure 16: Attitude: “Government gives a 
good return for taxes paid” and likelihood for 
tax registration 
 
Attitude: Cost of tax and compliance is high 
 
Although one would expect that a perception 
that the cost of tax compliance is high would 
have a negative impact on a decision for 
registering for tax, the analysis does not support 
such a conclusion. Statistical testing found no 
significant difference, and other survey findings 
support the more intuitive notion that 
perceptions of the burden of tax compliance 
costs may have a negative influence on the 




Figure 17: Attitude: “Tax compliance is 




























































                                                 
17 Statements mentioned are covered in question 18 in the informal survey. 
18 Chi square = 37.822, significant on 1% level 15 
 
Attitude: Everybody should/does pay taxes 
 
 
Respondents believing that all businesses should 
pay taxes and that most of them actually do (this 
category is combined from two statements about 
should everybody pay tax and if they actually 
do) are much more likely to register for tax, and 






















































Percentage of informal businesses likely to register
 
 
Figure 18: Attitude: “Everybody should (and 




Attitude: Information about registration is 
available 
 
It seems that attitude towards availability of 
information about tax registration and 
knowledge about it does not significantly 
influence the likelihood of registering for tax. 
(The level of significance is 10.4%) 
 
 
Figure 19: Attitude: “Information about 































































Percentage of informal businesses likely to register
 
 
Attitude: Tax authority/officers are unfair / corrupt 
 
Chi square analysis did not find the difference outlined in Figure 20 as significant at the 5% level of 
risk (the level of calculated risk is about 7%), but it still seems that there is at least a tendency 
showing that the belief that tax authority officers are unfair or corrupt may influence one’s decision 
to register for tax. 
 
Figure 20: Attitude: “Tax authority/officers 
are unfair / corrupt” and likelihood for tax 
registration 
 
The survey of registered SMMEs did not 
include a similar question. It was excluded 
based on previous surveys which found little 
evidence of corruption in tax administration in 
South Africa (SBP, op cite).
20
                                                 
19 Chi square = 42.657, significant on 1% level; correlation between the two variables is 0.291. 
20 See also Transparency International, where South Africa is ranked second-best in Africa (after Botswana) and on par 






























































Percentage of informal businesses likely to register16 
 
 
Problems / issues and likelihood of formalization 
 
 
An analysis was done on 14 different issues
21 on which respondents were asked to report whether a 
certain issue is an obstacle for their business operation and growth, and their relationship to the 
reported likelihood for registering for tax. It was reasonable to expect that respondents who reported 
having problems associated with “Not being registered for income tax”, “Not being registered for 
VAT” and “Not being registered for UIF” would in fact be more likely to report likelihood to 
register for such taxes in the near future. As one would expect, the differences were highly 
significant in differentiating respondents who reported they were likely to register from those not,
22
It is not surprising that respondents feeling they have to hide from the authorities to avoid paying 
tax consider registration more frequently
 
but such answers are not very useful in terms of policy implications.  
 
Most other issues showed themselves not to be very significant drivers for such a decision, so for 
these other issues, a more flexible significance rate of 10% will be used as a criterion to try to figure 
out which ones may have an influence on the likelihood for registration.  
 
23
•  Respondents considering labor regulations to be a problem are relatively more likely to 
consider registration for tax.
 than those not having this problem (Figure 21), but it is 
interesting that:  
 
24




•  Respondents citing transportation
 of financing as a problem are more likely to 

















 as a problem for their business are less likely to consider 
registration for tax than other firms. 
                                                 
21 The issue mentioned here are covered in question 16 of the informal questionnaire 
22 Chi squares of 13.104, 16.696 and 14.723 respectively significant on 1% level 
23 Chi square = 6.469, significant on 2% level 
24 Chi square = 3.319, significant on 7% level and correlated with number of employees. 
 
25 Chi square = 5.085, significant on 5% level 
26 Chi square = 3.347, significant on 7% level 
27 Chi square = 5.960, significant on 2% level 18 
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Since this analysis contradicts to a certain extent the previous finding (where most problems, 
considered individually, had a positive effect on the reported likelihood for registration) a deeper 
analysis was necessary to investigate this phenomenon. For each of the 14 investigated issues the 
respondents were divided into those considering it to be a major problem and those considering it 
only a problem of minor or moderate severity, or not a problem at all. As Figure 23 suggests, issues 
not highlighted in the previous analysis turn out to be an important predictor for likelihood for tax 
registration. The issues in question refer to infrastructure and government services, which some 
respondents feel are not being adequately provided. Thus it is expected that these respondents will 
have a lower likelihood to register for tax, relative to firms who report they are less troubled by 
these issues.  
 
The issues that, when perceived as a “major problem”, reduce the likelihood for registration are as 
follows: “Skills and education of available workers”
29, “Electricity”




33 and “Crime, theft and disorder”
34
                                                 
29 Chi square = 15.935, significant on 1% level 
30 Chi square = 17.541, significant on 1% level 
31 Chi square = 9.027, significant on 1% level 
32 Chi square = 13.894, significant on 1% level 
33 Chi square = 5.437, significant on 2% level 












































Percentage of informal businesses likely to register
 
 
The findings outlined in Figure 23 are in accordance with the findings in the analysis of various 
attitudes about government services. If businesses feel that government is providing good service 
for taxes paid and see the benefits of registration, then they are more likely to register. However, 
when businesses do not see services provided, then the likelihood for formalization is lower.  
 
In order to investigate more deeply, additional analysis was done comparing respondents reporting 
major problems with these issues and those not, and their respective attitudes towards government 
returns for taxes paid (Attitude: “Government gives a good return for taxes paid”). This analysis 
confirms that respondents reporting major problems with infrastructure and government services 
have a significantly lower attitude about the “returns” that businesses get from the government for 
taxes paid (see annex 3). Such firms, in turn, are relatively less likely to report they are considering 
registering for tax in the near future.23 
 
Perceived share of similar businesses paying all, some or none of the taxes and likelihood for 
registration 
 
Although the question of causality makes an interpretation somewhat difficult, it is interesting to see 
the relation between perception of share of businesses paying taxes (and to what degree) on one side 
and likelihood for registration on the other side. 
 
Figure 28: Perceived share of businesses paying taxes and likelihood for registration 
27 19 54
37 22 41
0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
































Paying some, but evade certain portion
Not paying tax at all
 
 
What figure 28 suggests is that both groups (those reporting they are likely to register for tax and 
those unlikely/neutral) have a similar perception about the share of businesses paying some of their 
taxes but evading a certain portion. However when it comes to perception of the share of businesses 
paying all of their taxes and the share of businesses paying none, their perceptions are quite 
different. Businesses who report they are likely to register perceive a significantly higher share of 
businesses paying all the taxes than businesses not likely/neutral to register (37% and 27% 
respectively)
37. Correspondingly, business not likely (or neutral) towards registration perceive that a 
significantly higher share of businesses “similar to” themselves are not paying taxes “at all” than 
those respondents who reported they were likely to register for tax (54% and 41% respectively)
38
                                                 
37 
T = 6.475, significant on 1% level 
38 
T = 6.812, significant on 1% level 
. 26 
 
Knowledge about the location of SARS office and awareness of tax amnesty compared to 
reported likelihood for registration 
 
 
Respondents who are aware of the nearest SARS office are more likely to register for tax than those 
unaware
42. Also, it seems that the respondents who were aware of Tax Amnesty were also more 
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Percentage of informal businesses likely to register
. However it seems that the level of knowledge about 
details concerning tax amnesty is about the same among respondents likely and unlikely to register. 
 
 
Figure 31: Awareness of nearest SARS office and Tax Amnesty and likelihood for registration 
 
 
                                                 
42 
Chi square = 13.125, significant on 1% level 
43 Chi square = 29.853, significant on 1% level 27 
 
Perception of percentage of formal and informal businesses suffering negative phenomena 
imposed by SARS and likelihood for registration 
 
 
Figure 32 suggests that, while likelihood for registration does not depend on perception of how 
frequently tax registered businesses have inspections and audits and suffer penalties and fines, 
businesses who are likely to register estimate the share of “caught” informal businesses to be higher 
than businesses not likely to register.
44
Figure 32: Perception of negative phenomena 
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Percentage of informal businesses likely to register
 
Figure 33: Experiencing negative phenomena 







































Percentage of informal businesses likely to register
 
 
Businesses were asked if they experienced any negative phenomena (i.e. cost) to sustain their 
informal status, such as: 
 
•  Paying bribes to sustain the informal status  
•  Providing free products or services to sustain the informal status  
•  Temporarily shutting business down to avoid being detected by SARS  
•  Relocating the business to avoid being detected by SARS. 
 
 
The great majority of respondents (94% of them) reported none. When an analysis was done to 
establish if these negative experiences might trigger the higher chance for registration, results show 







                                                 




3.  Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
 
The surveys of formal SMMEs and informal firms may provide useful information to guide the 
efforts of the National Treasury and SARS to encourage higher rates of voluntary registration 
among informal firms. Comparing the two surveys, it was noteworthy that firms in Gauteng 
province appear most oriented toward formality, with relatively low numbers of formal firms 
reporting they had ever operated informally before registering for tax and relatively high numbers 
of informal firms reporting they are likely to register for tax soon. This may suggest that 
formalization is easier to encourage in relatively urbanized settings. 
 
While almost 90% of formal firms reported they had never operated informally before registering 
for tax, firms in the primary sector (agriculture, forestry, fishing and mining), construction and 
manufacturing appear relatively more likely to start out informal and to register themselves at some 
point. By contrast, firms in trade and other services seem either to start out and stay informal or to 
initiate operation as a formal company registering for tax at the outset.  
 
As expected, businesses that are not registered for tax, but are registered with CIPRO, Chamber of 
Commerce, or other business associations, are relatively more likely to report they plan to register 
for tax. Similarly, informal firms with more employees appear more likely to register for tax. 
  
Interestingly, businesses who rent their premises are relatively more likely to register, probably 
because they anticipate a higher likelihood of coming to the attention of the authorities because their 
landlords may report the rental income.     
 
Informal businesses who keep financial records are significantly more likely to report they expect to 
register for tax, as are those who felt confidence in their abilities to do the necessary accounting and 
fill out tax forms. Those who knew the location of the nearest SARS office (and within that group, 
those who are closer to the SARS office) were also more likely to register. Informal firms who are 
concerned about their access to finance were relatively more likely to report they may register for 
tax. Conversely (but as expected), informal businesses who receive most of their income in cash 
report they are less likely to register for tax. Perceptions about SARS inspections and penalties did 
not appear to make statistically significant differences in the reported likelihood for registration, but 
a perception that many informal businesses are caught by SARS seemed to be associated with a 
relatively higher likelihood for registration. 
 
Attitudes toward government and perceptions of problems associated with government appear to 
have a significant influence on the likelihood of informal firms registering for tax. In particular, 
respondents who believe that government provides good service for taxes paid are significantly 
more likely to report that they may register for tax in the near future. Similarly, informal firms who 
believe that everyone should pay some tax (and who believe that most firms do pay taxes) are more 
likely to report they may register for tax. These attitudes are much more significant than the 
respondents’ attitude toward the availability of information about tax registration. 
 
Firms complaining about “major problems” associated with crime, infrastructure (telecoms, 
transportation and electricity) and “skills and education of available workers” were relatively less 
likely to register for tax than firms who perceived such issues to be less serious problems. Thus 29 
 
solving or mitigating such problems may reap rewards for the government in the form of higher 
formalization and tax compliance. 
 
Perceived advantages of registration for tax included “better opportunities for growth”, followed by 
“being legal”, “helping the poor/community”, “access to financing” and “better access to 
government services.” Disadvantages, as expected, included the financial burden of taxation, and 
dissatisfaction about government services. Closer examination of SARS’ data on tax returns from 




The picture of formalization is therefore somewhat complex, with relatively few clear opportunities 
for SARS to encourage higher rates of voluntary tax registration on the basis of their own behavior 
or performance. Rather, informal businesses seem most encouraged to register when they view 
government services as “good value” for taxes paid, when they perceive that most businesses (e.g., 
their own suppliers, customers, and competitors) are paying taxes, and when they are carrying out 
basic bookkeeping.  
 
Of course, from the point of view of public finance, there may appear to be a “chicken and egg” 
problem: formalization could be encouraged by improved government services, but such services 
must be paid for by revenues. Given the fact that small businesses yield only tiny amounts of 
revenue under the best of circumstances, it is probably the government side that should move first to 
target improved services in communities where there appears to be high levels of informality; 
targeting those services that appear to be of most concern to small businesses (i.e., crime, 
infrastructure and worker skills). Improved services, in turn could form the basis of a coordinated 
campaign by the GoSA to showcase improvements in public services wherever possible, and to 
stress the need for higher levels of compliance to expand/improve services. It may also be worth 
considering whether resources for local governments to pay for critical services are adequate to 
encourage higher rates of voluntary tax compliance. 
 
While general trends away from reliance on cash payments for transactions and toward electronic 
and other bank-mediated forms of payment may over time help to encourage more formalization 
(and tax compliance more broadly), NT and SARS want to look for ways to encourage those trends.  
Since likelihood for formalization seems to be associated with the practice of proper bookkeeping, it 
may also be advantageous for NT and SARS to encourage small businesses to maintain regular 
books, to learn the basics of bookkeeping, and/or to hire the necessary expertise. It would be 
beneficial to remind small businesses that proper bookkeeping is important for the financial health 
of all businesses, and critical for any business that aspires to expand. Another key message should 
be that tax compliance expands business opportunities to enter the supply chain of larger businesses 
and to gain improved access to larger and wealthier markets. SARS’ SME office (perhaps working 
in cooperation with SME Associations) may help expand bookkeeping training for small businesses, 
especially in conjunction with the new turnover tax, which is designed to be handled by 
entrepreneurs with limited accounting skills. Working in cooperation with SME associations may be 
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Annex 1: Analytical methods used 
 
In order to support the findings outlined here a number of very simple statistical methods were 
used: 
 
T-test for independent samples was used when analysis of continuous data was performed. T-test 
scores were quoted together with significance levels.  
 
Chi squares were use when analysis of categorical data was performed. Chi square results were 
quoted also together with their significance levels. Chi square test were performed only in case 
when visual inspection of cross tabulation confirmed that the eventual statistical significance can be 
interpreted, e.g. that the direction of difference is clear and unambiguous. 
 
Analysis of variance was performed to analyze relations of continuous and categorical variables. F-
statistics were quoted with their significance levels. As addition Scheffe tests were also performed 
to determine the exact categories between which the significant difference exists. 
 
Factor analysis with principal components as the extraction method was used. Also component 
matrix was rotated to achieve best possible solution using Varimax rotation method. Factor analysis 
was used only in order to confirm or deny the selection of logical groups among attitude statements. 
 
When the above mentioned significance test were not possible a simple analysis of cross-tabulations 
was done searching for patterns. 33 
 
Annex 2: grouping of statement under question 18 
 
Grouping was done based on logical analysis into five different aspects of attitudes
45
Government is doing a good job of providing services to your business 
. In other words 
statement were grouped into 5 categories (below) depending on the subject they are covering.  
Attitude: Government gives a good return for taxes paid 
Attitude: Cost of tax and compliance is high 
Attitude: Everybody should (and does) pay taxes 
Attitude: Information about registration is available 
Attitude: Tax authority/officers are unfair / corrupt 
 
Group 1 
There are many benefits for businesses that pay taxes  Group 1 
Tax rates for businesses such as yours are too high  Group 2 
Businesses registered for tax are often subjected to SARS audits and inspections  Group 2 
Keeping records for tax purposes is time-consuming and expensive  Group 2 
Professional bookkeepers or accountants are too expensive  Group 2 
Tax authorities are unfair   Group 5 
Every business should pay taxes  Group 3 
Most businesses do pay taxes  Group 3 
Tax procedures are too complicated  Group 2 
All information about tax compliance is easily available  Group 4 
SARS officials are corrupt  Group 5 




In order to check the validity of this logical grouping, factor analysis
46
                                                 
45 Statement 14 wasn’t used in this grouping because it represents likelihood for registration rather than an attitude. 
46 It is important to note that statistical conditions for factor analysis are not satisfied. Items under consideration are not on the proven interval scale, and this analysis should be used for 
guidance and checking purposes only. 
 was performed on 13 
statements under question 18 and it corresponds to logical grouping. Groups 5 did not separate itself 
as an independent factor but is rather covered by components 1 and 2, but due to its specific logical 
meaning it will be separated in grouping. Table below shows factor loadings (correlations) with 
particular statements. The higher the loading (in both positive and negative direction) the more can 
the factor be explained by particular statement.. Loadings marked yellow are the highest ones for 
















  Rotated Component Matrix(a) 
 
   Component 
   1  2  3  4 
Government is doing a good job at providing services to your 
business  -.081  .207  -.086  .815 
There are many benefits for businesses that pay taxes  .115  -.057  .338  .747 
Tax rates for businesses such as yours are too high  .765  .007  -.005  .138 
Businesses registered for tax often subjected to audits and 
inspections  .740  -.049  .036  .145 
Keeping records for tax purposes is cumbersome and expensive  .796  -.016  .021  .012 
Professional bookkeepers or accountants are too expensive  .811  -.033  .087  -.012 
Tax authorities are unfair  .601  .215  -.168  -.249 
Every business should pay taxes  .009  .195  .754  .024 
Most businesses pay taxes  .145  .075  .687  .089 
Tax procedures are too complicated  .579  -.021  .188  -.249 
All information about tax compliance is easily available  -.102  .760  .251  .055 
SARS officials are corrupt  .286  .487  -.398  -.112 
You know exactly what to do to register for income tax  -.014  .813  .126  .141 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser 
Normalization. a  Rotation converged in 5 iterations. 
 
After grouping scores were added for evaluation of statements under each group. Respondents were 
then divided into three groups according to their average scores (under each group): those with 
above neutral attitude, those with neutral attitude and those with below neutral attitude. 
Respondents with neutral attitude were excluded from analysis because it is difficult to estimate if 
their attitude is really neutral or non-existing. Respondents with above and below neutral attitude 
were directly compared.35 
 











































Chi square tests for issues as major problems and agreement with the attitude “Government gives a 
good return for taxes paid” 
Issue as a major problem  Chi 
square 
Sig. 
Telecommunication  4.339  0.037 
Electricity  3.843  0.050 
Transportation  13.921  0.000 
Skills and education of available workers  11.077  0.001 
Bribery and corruption  5.876  0.015 















The share of respondents seeing certain issues as a major problem varies across issues. 
 
  Attitude: Government gives a good return on taxes paid 
   Total  Disagree  Agree 
   Valid N  Column N %  Column N %  Column N % 
Telecommunications  Major problem  98  12.1  13.6  8.3 
   Not a major problem  712  87.9  86.4  91.7 
   Total  810  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Electricity  Major problem  144  17.4  19.1  13.3 
   Not a major problem  682  82.6  80.9  86.7 
   Total  826  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Transportation  Major problem  173  20.9  24.2  12.4 
   Not a major problem  656  79.1  75.8  87.6 
   Total  829  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Skills and education 
of available workers 
Major problem  119  14.9  17.6  8.3 
   Not a major problem  679  85.1  82.4  91.7 
   Total  798  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Bribery and 
Corruption 
Major problem  117  14.8  16.7  9.9 
   Not a major problem  673  85.2  83.3  90.1 
   Total  790  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Crime, theft and 
disorder 
Major problem  278  34.2  39.7  20.6 
   Not a major problem  534  65.8  60.3  79.4 




The share of respondents seeing “Crime, theft and disorder” as a major issue is 34%, while for other 
issues it varies between 12% (for “Telecommunications”) and 21% (for “Transportation”). 
To try to identify who are these respondents seeing the mentioned issues as major problems an 



















  Province 
















n N % 
Colum
n N % 
Colum
n N % 
Colum
n N % 
Colum
n N % 
Telecommunications  Major problem  107  11.2  11.4  2.1  13.5  16.4 
   Not a major problem  849  88.8  88.6  97.9  86.5  83.6 
   Total  956  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Electricity  Major problem  163  16.7  18.8  4.7  17.6  22.9 
   Not a major problem  811  83.3  81.2  95.3  82.4  77.1 
   Total  974  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Transportation  Major problem  196  20.0  17.1  5.6  28.0  28.8 
   Not a major problem  783  80.0  82.9  94.4  72.0  71.2 
   Total  979  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Skills and education 
of available workers 
Major problem  135  14.3  10.8  5.2  18.9  21.2 
   Not a major problem  809  85.7  89.2  94.8  81.1  78.8 
   Total  944  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Bribery and 
Corruption 
Major problem  127  13.6  10.0  5.2  23.1  18.8 
   Not a major problem  804  86.4  90.0  94.8  76.9  81.2 
   Total  931  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Crime, theft and 
disorder 
Major problem  314  32.6  26.1  16.8  39.5  45.6 
   Not a major problem  648  67.4  73.9  83.2  60.5  54.4 
   Total  962  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
 
 
Due to a relatively small number of respondents in some regions a regional division used in 
provincial analysis is separating three regions and putting the rest of them in a common category. 
Analysis shows that for all issues share of respondents claiming them a major problem is lower in 
Western Cape. On the other end this share is higher in “Other provinces”. Gauteng and Kwazulu 
Natal are usually around national average with some exceptions. Transportation, “Skills and 
education of available workers”, “Bribery and corruption” and “Crime theft and disorder” also seem 
to be somewhat more of a problem in Kwazulu Natal than it is on average. Gauteng is for all issue 














  Sector 
   Total 
Agriculture, 
construction, 
manufacturing  Trade  Services 
   Valid N  Column N %  Column N %  Column N %  Column N % 
Telecommunications  Major problem  107  11.2  8.6  7.6  14.4 
   Not a major problem  849  88.8  91.4  92.4  85.6 
   Total  956  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Electricity  Major problem  163  16.7  10.5  15.0  19.8 
   Not a major problem  811  83.3  89.5  85.0  80.2 
   Total  974  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Transportation  Major problem  196  20.0  18.7  18.9  21.2 
   Not a major problem  783  80.0  81.3  81.1  78.8 
   Total  979  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Skills and education 
of available workers 
Major problem  135  14.3  11.0  11.2  17.4 
   Not a major problem  809  85.7  89.0  88.8  82.6 
   Total  944  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Bribery and 
Corruption 
Major problem  127  13.6  10.6  12.9  15.0 
   Not a major problem  804  86.4  89.4  87.1  85.0 
   Total  931  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Crime, theft and 
disorder 
Major problem  314  32.6  24.7  32.9  34.9 
   Not a major problem  648  67.4  75.3  67.1  65.1 
   Total  962  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
 
 
Although differences are not very noticeable, one can see that services sector sees all issues more 
frequently as a major problem. Another interesting finding is that “agriculture, construction, 
manufacturing” sees crime, theft and disorder less frequently as a major issue than other sectors.39 
 
 
  Turnover 
   Total 
70K  - 300K 
Rand 
More than 
300 K Rand 
   Valid N  Column N %  Column N %  Column N % 
Telecommunications  Major problem  107  11.2  11.1  12.0 
   Not a major problem  849  88.8  88.9  88.0 
   Total  956  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Electricity  Major problem  163  16.7  16.9  15.7 
   Not a major problem  811  83.3  83.1  84.3 
   Total  974  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Transportation  Major problem  196  20.0  19.8  21.8 
   Not a major problem  783  80.0  80.2  78.2 
   Total  979  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Skills and education 
of available workers 
Major problem  135  14.3  13.9  17.2 
   Not a major problem  809  85.7  86.1  82.8 
   Total  944  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Bribery and 
Corruption 
Major problem  127  13.6  12.3  22.9 
   Not a major problem  804  86.4  87.7  77.1 
   Total  931  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Crime, theft and 
disorder 
Major problem  314  32.6  32.0  37.3 
   Not a major problem  648  67.4  68.0  62.7 
   Total  962  100.0  100.0  100.0 
 
 
The only significant indication related to turnover refers to bribery and corruption. Larger 





















  Number of workers 







n N % 
Colum
n N % 
Colum
n N % 
Colum
n N % 
Colum
n N % 
Colum
n N % 
Telecommunications  Major problem  107  11.2  5.5  7.7  12.7  18.1  11.6 
   Not a major problem  849  88.8  94.5  92.3  87.3  81.9  88.4 
   Total  956  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Electricity  Major problem  163  16.7  9.5  14.9  19.6  21.8  17.4 
   Not a major problem  811  83.3  90.5  85.1  80.4  78.2  82.6 
   Total  974  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Transportation  Major problem  196  20.0  17.2  16.3  23.2  23.9  18.6 
   Not a major problem  783  80.0  82.8  83.7  76.8  76.1  81.4 
   Total  979  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Skills and education 
of available workers 
Major problem  135  14.3  14.0  11.3  13.1  16.5  20.8 
   Not a major problem  809  85.7  86.0  88.7  86.9  83.5  79.2 
   Total  944  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Bribery and 
Corruption 
Major problem  127  13.6  7.4  12.4  13.5  19.7  14.5 
   Not a major problem  804  86.4  92.6  87.6  86.5  80.3  85.5 
   Total  931  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Crime, theft and 
disorder 
Major problem  314  32.6  23.7  32.1  36.0  36.7  35.7 
   Not a major problem  648  67.4  76.3  67.9  64.0  63.3  64.3 
   Total  962  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
 
 
Five out of six issues have the similar trend when it comes to seeing issues as a major problem and 
size of the business measured by number of its employees. The trend is that share of businesses 
seeing it as a problem grows with size, but then drops for the highest category. Generally we might 
conclude that perception of issues as a major problem rises with size, but it seems that some 
(probably largest) businesses are immune to these problems. 
 